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RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN MONEY JUDGMENTS:
A GOAL-ORIENTED APPROACH
ALAN E. GOLOMB
INTRODUCTION
The first purpose 'of conflicts law, as of all
law, is to introduce order, or at least that
minimum which is necessary if basic human
values are not to be unduly sacrificed or sub-
jected to discrimination.'
If this basic purpose is accepted, it is clear that conflicts
problems must be studied in terms of social policies, rather
than as exercises in deductive logic.2 The increase of
international trade and travel and, of particular import
to this study, the increase in commercial operations by
American business abroad, will involve American courts
in many situations with international implications, in
which it is to be hoped that the relevant social policies
will be considered. One such situation certain to confront
American courts in increasing number will be claims in-
volving the recognition of foreign money judgments.
The perennial casebook introduction to judgment rec-
ognition claims is Bvwhan v. Ruoker.3  Plaintiff sued on
a judgment of the Island Court in Tobago. The defendant
had never been to the island, and service was effected
by nailing the summons to the courthouse door, as author-
ized by Tobago law. Lord Ellenborough asked: "Can the
island of Tobago pass a law to bind the rights of the whole
world?" Although recognition was refused through a
* B.A., Brooklyn College; J.D., St. John's University School of Law;
Graduate Fellow, Yale Law School; Member of the New York Bar.
'Yntena, The Objectives of Private International Law, 35 CAN. BAR.
REv. 721, 736 (1957).
2 Id. at 731.
3 9 East 192 (K.B. 1808).
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restrictive interpretation of the Tobago statute, the only
inference to be drawn from the opinion is in the negative.
A more contemporary situation involves the famous
French skier, Jean Claude Killy. As a jurisdictional basis
for a paternity suit against Filly, an Austrian court
ordered the seizure of some underwear allegedly left by
Filly in an Austrian hotel.4  The Austrian Code provides
for in personam jurisdiction over a defendant who owns
assets of any value in Austria.' Austria's assertion of
power to render such a judgment may be termed an
initial claim to competence; when it seeks to have other
states defer to that adjudication, it is making a second-
ary claim to competence. What reception such a secondary
claim might be accorded in France or another country
where Filly might own property presents an interesting
question. Resolution of this and other problems will be
the subject of this paper.
Due to limitations upon time and expertise, emphasis
will be placed on the law of the United States. The
study will attempt to resolve, first, under what circum-
stances should a foreign judgment be recognized and,
second, how can desired recognition policies be attained
in a federal system such as ours. The primary concern
of this paper will be money judgments. Since in rem
and status judgments involve special considerations,' it
is thought wiser to leave a detailed analysis to another
paper.
A cursory description of present American policy
concerning foreign judgment recognition, and how it com-
4 Ski News Int'l., Feb. 3, 1968, at 1.
5 See Nadelmann, Non-recognition of American Money Judgments Abroad
And What To Do About It, 42 IOWA L. REv. 236, 261 (1957).
6For example, the interest of a nation in real property located within
its territory raises special problems. Similarly, determinations concerning
the marital status of nationals are felt more vital to the home state than
resolutions of money disputes. Also relevant is the obviously greater need
for security when the ownership of land or, especially, the status of a
marriage or an adoption is in issue. Due to this special need for certainty,
the tendency of most nations is towards recognition of foreign decrees
as to status and land, unless clearly in violation of the public policy of
the recognizing state. See Smit, International Res Judicata and Collateral
Estoppel in the United States, 9 U.C.L.A. L. Rnv. 44 (1962).
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pares with the policies of other members of the world
community, would seem helpful at this point.
As a general rule, American courts will recognize
judgments of foreign nations to the same extent as they
defer to sister-state judgments. Despite the absence of a
full faith and credit mandate,' there is a carryover of
rules developed within our own federal system,' often
without an independent evaluation of policy.' The Re-
statement finds that "a valid judgment rendered in a
foreign nation after a fair trial in a contested proceeding
will be recognized in the United States so far as the im-
mediate parties and the underlying cause of action are
concerned."'" A judgment is usually considered valid
if
(a) the state in which it is rendered has jurisdiction to act
judicially in the case; and (b) a reasonable method of notification
is employed and a reasonable opportunity to be heard is afforded
to persons affected; and (c) the judgment is rendered by a
competent court; and (d) there is compliance with such require-
ments of the state of rendition as are necessary for the valid
exercise of power by the court."
7See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Tremblay, 223 U.S. 185 (1912).8 See von Mehren & Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudicationa:
A Survey and a Suggested Approach, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1601, 1695(1968). See also J. CASTEL, PRIVAIM INEmNATIONAL LAw 258 (1960).
9See Smit, supra note 6, at 44.
20 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 98 (Proposed
Official Draft, 1967).
1Id. § 92. This test seems more liberal than the test stated in
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895), generally considered to be a pro-
gressive approach, that a foreign judgment will be recognized where there
was jurisdiction and:
there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad before
a court of competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon regular
proceedings, after due citation or voluntary appearance of the
defendant, and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure an
impartial administration of justice between the citizens of its own
country and those of other countries and there is nothing to show
either prejudice in the court, or in the system of laws under which
it is sitting, or fraud in procuring the judgment, or any other
special reason why the comity of this nation should not allow it
full effect ...
Id. at 202. One "special reason," lack of reciprocity, will be considered
later in the text.
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Ordinarily, therefore, a foreign judgment will be held
conclusive, despite alleged errors of law or fact..2
With the most notable exception of England, " Amer-
ican courts accord far better treatment to foreign judgments
than do other nations. Many nations, of which France
is the most notorious, maintain a general review for any
error of law or fact-the so-called "rev-ision, au fond." 14
Possibly a majority of the world community, led by
Germany, requires reciprocity as a basic prerequisite to
recognition of a foreign nation's judgment.'
Further treatment of the subject requires clarification
of the distinction between "recognition" and "enforcement"
of a judgment.
A foreign judgment is recognized . . . when it is given the same
effect that it has in the state where it was rendered with respect
to the parties, the subject matter of the action and the issues
involved. A foreign judgment is enforced when, in addition to
being recognized, a party is given the affirmative relief to which
the judgment entitles him. Recognition of a judgment is a con-
dition precedent to its enforcement.' 6
Am example of recognition without enforcement is where
a victorious defendant in the first action asserts that
judgment as a "bar" to a subsequent suit on the same
cause of action by plaintiff. However, unlike American
12 Reese, The Status in this Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad,
50 CoLumT. L. Rnv. 783, 789 (1950).
13English courts reach results similar to American courts. However,
current English authority finds a "legal obligation" to recognize a foreignjudgment, negatived only by lack of jurisdicton, fraud, or public policy.
The "ups and downs" of foreign judgment recognition history in England
are traced in A. DicEy & J. Mopmis, CoxFLIcr OF LAws 967 (8th ed.
1967).
14 The 1964 decision by the Cour de Cassation, the highest civil court
in France, in Munzer v. Minzer, may indicate a relaxation of review
by French courts. See Nadelmann, French Courts Recognize Foreign
Money Judgments: One Down and More to Go, 13 Am. J. CoxMp. L. 72(1964). One jurisdiction which allows reargument of all issues, Quebec,
is of particular annoyance to Americans. See J. CAsTEL, supra note 8,
at 271. Other jurisdictions traditionally harsh to foreign judgments include
Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden (although the latter
nation may be liberalizing its attitude). Surveys of other nations appear
in Nadelmann, supra at 78-80 and Comment, Reciprocal Enforcement of
United States and Foreign Judgments, 2 Tmx. INT'L L.F. 75, 87-97 (1966).
1 
5 Nadelmann, supra note 14, at 78.
10 RESTATEMENT § 98, supra note 10, at 342.
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law for domestic judgments, a cause of action does not
"merge" into the judgment, so that a victorious plaintiff
may elect to sue on the judgment or on the underlying
cause of action." The basic question that an American
court must confront is whether to recognize a foreign
judgment. Once it is concluded that the judgment will
be recognized, it will be enforced in the same manner
as a sister-state judgment.
The aim of this paper is to seek a recognition policy
that will suffer neither from provincial intolerance nor
unthinking generosity, but, rather, will balance conflicting
interests in furtherance of the common interest of all
mankind. The perspectives will be that of an impartial
observer. The first step is to clarify the basic goals
that this writer considers relevant to claims for or against
recognition of foreign judgments. These goals include:
(1) Fairness to litigants. This is probably the most im-
portant goal and becomes a factor in various contexts, e.g.,
claims of lack of jurisdiction over the defendant, claims
of unfairness of the first proceeding, claims that the first
judgment was fairly rendered and, therefore, it would be
unfair to compel the winner to relitigate.
(2) Avoidance of international conflicts. This may oc-
cur, e.g., when there is a claim that the rendering state's
judgment was an infringement upon another state's policies
or nationals.
(3) Avoidance of duplication of effort and waste. This,
along with fairness to the litigants, is the basic rationale
supporting claims for res judicata.
(4) Encourage convenient forum to try a lawsuit. The
likelihood of accurate fact-finding, reduced expenses, and
convenience to parties and witnesses will be facilitated by
such a policy.
(5) Security in international transactions. By this, it
is meant that questions should be settled in accordance
17 Smlt, .s pra note 6, at 55.
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with a rule of law and that a given situation should have
equal legal treatment everywhere. While many claims in
which this goal will be relevant will also involve fairness
to litigants, this goal is more directly aimed at unification
of the world community.
(6) Encourage international trade and travel. This goal
is pertinent to claims that an alien is unreasonably sub-
jected to the jurisdiction of a court or that an alien
was not fairly treated by a court, as well as to claims
that a valid cause of action should receive satisfaction.
18
It is clear that various goals become increasingly
relevant depending upon the underlying cause of action.
As previously mentioned, security is essential when marital
status is in issue. Similarly, encouragement of trade be-
comes significant when the action is based upon contract.
However, since this study is focused on money judgments,
and it is believed that no operative difference in relevant
goals is usually apparent whether the money claim was
in contract or tort (the basic possibilities), claims will be
treated without reference to the underlying cause of
action. The possibility of distinguishing between under-
lying money claims should, however, be kept in mind.
The goals outlined above, as an impartial observer
would see them, may be defined as interests of the general
community of nations, or "inclusive" interests. Also to
be recognized, however, in furtherance of the common in-
terest, are the valid claims of particular states, i.e., "ex-
clusive" interests. Exclusive interests may be asserted by
the rendering state (Fl) or the recognizing state (F2).
Exclusive interests relevant to the recognition of foreign
judgments include: (a) control over events which affect
a state's territory, people, or institutions; (b) fulfillment
of the public policies of a particular state; (c) conservation
of judicial resources of the particular state; and (d)
securing favorable treatment abroad for a state's own
Is Some of the goals are discussed in von Mehren & Trautman, supra
note 8, at 1603-05 and Yntema, supra note 1, at 735.
19691
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judgments. To be disapproved are the "special' interests
of particular states, antagonistic to the common interest,
such as that of favoring nationals despite fair treatment
abroad.
In many instances, the various inclusive and exclusive
interests will conflict. For example, recognition of a
judgment rendered by a forum with no contacts with the
dispute would further some inclusive and exclusive in-
terests at the expense of others. When such conflict arises,
there must be a careful analysis of the goals involved, and
then a balancing of the interests to determine which
should control.
WHAT JUDGMENTS SHiOULD BE RECOGNIZED
Factors Not Related to Fairness in the Individital Case
1) International Law
The first issue to be considered is whether recognition
of foreign judgments is dictated by present notions of what
represents international law. For an affirmative answer,
it must appear that there is applicable either customary
law or treaty obligation. Clearly, there is no internation-
ally acknowledged customary rule of international law
that a state must recognize any judgment. 9 This lack
of customary law is evident from the practice of the
majority of states not to recognize foreign judgments
absent a treaty. In addition, although there are some
bilateral and even multilateral treaties on judgment re-
cognition, the United States is not a party to any of these.
Therefore, American courts are free from any world com-
munity regulation in their decisions on recognition.
2) Act of State
A second doctrine which may be argued to impose a
duty upon American courts to recognize foreign adjudi-
19 Graupner, Some Recent Aspects of the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Judgments in Western Europe, 12 INT'L & ComP. L.Q. 367,
374 (1963). See A. A. EHRENzwEiG, A T EAaisE ON THE Co rmCT OF
LAWs 48 (1962).
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cations is the act of state concept. As stated by Chief
Justice Fuller in Underhill v. Hernandez :20
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country
will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of
another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances
by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open
to be availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.
This doctrine was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme
Court, though under different circumstances, in the con-
troversial decision of Banco Yaciona de Cuba . Sab-
batino.2" The Court held that the uncompensated seizure
of sugar by the Cuban government was an act of state,
the legality of which could not be challenged in an American
court.22  While the doctrine was found not to be a
requirement of international 23 or constitutional law," it
did have "'constitutional' underpinnings." 25 Basically, the
rationale was one of separation of powers, i.e., judicial
scrutiny of the sovereign acts of another nation within
its own territory could interfere with the handling of the
problem by the executive branch."
Theoretically, any deference to secondary claims to com-
petence can be considered an application of the act of
state doctrine. However, it would seem that most foreign
judgments will not be accorded "act of state" treatment, as
that term is used in the Sabbatino opinion and in the
Restatement. This was the opinion of the circuit court
in Sabbatino,7 where it was stated that since court judg-
ments ordinarily involve the resolution of private disputes
and do not ordinarily reflect high state policy, they most
20 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897).
21376 U.S. 398 (1964).
22 Soon after the decision, Congress overruled the Court's holding, in
art, by providing that the courts shall examine an act of state to
etermine whether it is in violation of international law. The Foreign
Assistance Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 1009, 1013 (1964), as amended, 22 U.S.C.
§2370(e) (2) (Supp. 1965).23376 U.S. at 421.
24 1d. at 423.25 Id.
26Id. at 431-33.
27307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962).
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often will not fall within the act of state category. The
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law explains that an
act of state involves the public interests of a state beyond
its interest in providing the means for adjudicating dis-
putes within its territory.2 8 The branch of government
taking the action is not as important as the nature of the
action taken. However, a court adjudication is not the
ordinary way for a state to effectuate its essential public
interests. For example,
In a suit in tort brought by X against Y, a court of state A
decides that X is entitled to a specified amount of damages.
This decision is not an act of state. . . . State A obtains by
eminent domain proceedings title to an electric utility system in
its territory. The vesting of title is an act of state... 29
If the aims sought to be accomplished by the act of
state doctrine are analyzed in the context of an ordinary
contract or tort judgment situation, it seems that the
fairness to litigants goal outweighs the potential impair-
ment of the other relevant goals, viz., avoidance of inter-
national conflicts, security in international transactions, and
encouragement of trade and travel. Even the Sabbatino
majority indicated that a court judgment re-examination
is not very sensitive politically.3 0 The security goal of
a universal rule of law is not so impaired when the rule
of law asserted would be unfair to the parties involved.
Additionally, the purpose served by the act of state doc-
trine of facilitating international trade is not as applicable
when the reliance of the world business community is
allegedly being placed only upon a court judgment. The
tremendous impact that a general nationalization of an
industry by a sovereign has upon the international business
community will not be found in the case of a simple money
judgment in which only a few parties are likely to be
affected. An act of state contention should, therefore,
ordinarily be rejected.
2 8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATEs § 41, comment d (1965 rev. ed.).2 9 Id.
30 376 U.S. at 412.
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3) Comity
Another doctrine which may be asserted to govern
recognition of foreign judgments, without consideration of
the fairness of the judgment, is that of comity. This
is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor
of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the
legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having
due regard both to international duty and convenience, and
to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under
the protection of its laws . .31
The concept of comity was derived from the writings of
Grotius and Vattel, who distinguished between rules spring-
ing from the Law of Nature and rules belonging to the
Voluntary Law. Unlike natural law, voluntary law was
changeable and dependent upon the consent of individual
nations. This theory laid the foundation for the dis-
tinction made by American writers, most notably Story,
between obligations of right and concessions of comity. 2
The earliest Supreme Court decision espousing this dis-
tinction was Bank of Augusta v. Earle,"3 where comity
was identified as part of the voluntary law of nations.
However, the comity doctrine is incurably deficient
as a guide to recognition policy. It has been accurately
observed that the definition of comity "says in fact only
that recognition will be given when it will be given." "
The uselessness of the term probably is reflected by its
decreasing appearance as the underlying rationale in re-
cent cases. 5 Nevertheless, while the comity doctrine will
31 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
32 Lerhoff, Reciprocity: The Legal Aspects of a Perennial Idea, 49 Nw.
U. L. REv. 752, 753-54 (1954-55). See also A. A. EnREzwIG, supra
note 19, at 45.
33 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 589 (1839).
31 Smit, supra note 6, at 54.
35Id. As previously noted, the doctrine of comity in England was
superceded by the doctrine of legal obligation set forth in Russell v.
Smyth, [1842] 9M & W. 810, 819, that a judgment of a court of com-
petent jurisdiction imposes a duty upon a defendant to pay the sum
declared due, which English courts are bound to enforce unless the
duty is negatived by lack of jurisdiction, fraud, or violation of public
1969 J
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not prove much help to the judge trying to decide a
particular case, it does reflect a generally desirable pro-
pensity of American courts to recognize a foreign judg-
ment which is not objectionable for some cogent reason.
Notions of comity, when due consideration is given to
fairness of the judgment, serve to implement goals of
lessening conflict among nations, conservation of judicial
resources, and security in international transactions.
4) Reciprocity
These attributes of comity sentiment were severely
limited by the case of Hilton v. Guyot," in which the
concept of comity was inextricably linked to reciprocity.
In Hilton, plaintiff was a French firm suing American
citizens on a judgment of a French court. Action was
commenced in a federal court, which entered judgment
for the plaintiff, without examining the merits. The
Supreme Court, after setting forth a very enlightened and
liberal position on recognition of foreign judgments, noted
that France would not accord recognition to an American
judgment, and, accordingly, reversed the judgment for
plaintiff. The Court explained:
In holding such a judgment, for want of reciprocity, not to be
conclusive evidence of the merits of the claim, we do not proceed
upon any theory of retaliation upon one person by reason of in-justice done to another; but upon the broad ground that inter-
national law is founded upon mutuality and reciprocity, and that
by the principles of international law recognized in most civilized
nations, and by the comity of our own country which it is our
judicial duty to know and to declare, the judgment is not entitled
to be considered conclusive. 37
policy. In practice, the legal obligation theory in most cases does not
result in a greater degree of recognition than does the comity theory.
In one area, fraud, an English court is even more likely to refuse
recognition. See A. DIcEY & J. Momus, .ipra note 13, at 967,
1009.
36159 U.S. 113 (1895).
37 Id. at 228. Under this rationale, in Ritchie v. McMullen, 159 U.S.
235 (1895), a case decided the same day as Hilton, a Canadian judgment
was found conclusive, since Canadian courts gave conclusive effect to
American judgments.
[ VOL. 43
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The dissenting opinion, by Chief Justice Fuller, reasoned
that the doctrine of res judicata is just as applicable to
foreign judgments as to domestic judgments, resting on
the same public policy ground that there should be an
end to litigation. It was argued that it is for the govern-
ment, not the courts, to adopt the principle of retorsion.3
The majority was correct in its statement that mutual-
ity and reciprocity are the foundations of international
law, though in a less specific sense. 9 It is often only the
underlying though unexpressed threat of retaliation that
induces a nation to defer its special interests in favor of
the interests of other nations.4" The doctrine of reci-
procity is clearly the basis of judgment recognition prac-
tice in most of the world today." However, the use of the
reciprocity doctrine by the Hilton Court has met with the
practically unanimous disapproval of American commenta-
tors.2
The primary reason for this disapprobation has been
the realization that the reciprocity requirement operates
mainly at the expense of the judgment creditor, who
clearly is not to blame for the rulings of his own nation's
courts. The legitimate expectations of creditors deserve
protection across state lines. Further analysis of Hilton
reveals that it achieves neither of its two probable major
goals. The Court limited its holding to cases in which a
citizen of F1 receives a judgment in a suit brought by
him in F1 against a citizen of F2, and then attempts to
to enforce such judgment in F2. It was indicated that
an F1 judgment deciding a controversy between two F1
citizens, or one in which the action was commenced and
won by a foreigner against an F1 citizen, would be con-
clusive.4  Since the Court's policy of non-recognition
38 159 U.S. at 229-34.
39See Lenhoff, Reciprocity: The Legal Aspects of A Perennial Idea,
49 Nw. U. L. REv. 619 (1954).
40See Falk, International Jurisdiction: Horizontal and Vertical Con-
ceptions of Legal Order, 32 Tnlep. L. Q. 295, 315-16 (1959).
41 See Graupner, supra note 19, at 369-79.
42See Smit, supra note 6, at 50.
43Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 170-71 (1895).
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without reciprocity was primarily aimed at judgments
rendered by foreign courts against American defendants,
it has been concluded by some commentators that pro-
tection of Americans was one underlying reason for the
holding.44 However, if this were true, the Court over-
looked the question of fairness of the F1 judgment. While
protecting nationals from unfair treatment abroad is a
valid exclusive interest of a state, favoring nationals de-
spite fair treatment abroad should not be commended.
If Hilton is regarded as an attempt by the Supreme
Court to secure recognition for American judgments
abroad, not an unreasonable state interest, the decision
has not achieved its desired effect. American judgments
fare very badly abroad, even today.45 Possibly the limited
application of Hilton to judgments rendered against
American defendants in favor of F1 nationals, when com-
pared to the sweeping reciprocity policies of other nations,
reduces its effectiveness as a means of persuading other
states to recognize American judgments. 6 The Hilton
decision did not induce France to relax in its rHvision. aze
fond. Apparently, the strict reciprocity doctrine of Ger-
many was the motivating factor. " Probably more damag-
ing, however, to the fate of American judgments abroad is
that foreign nations with reciprocity rules look at Hilton,
and conclude that the United States would not recognize
one of their judgments. The Hilton rule then leads
American courts to refuse recognition to judgments of
those countries. This circularity does not further any of
the relevant goals of judgment recognition policies. It
would seem that a clear renunciation of the reciprocity
doctrine by American courts might be a more effective
44See Reese, supra note 12, at 793; Smit, supra note 6, at 49;
Comment, supra note 14, at 80.45 See Nadelmann, supra note 5; Nadelmann, Reprisals Against American
Judgments, 65 Hagv. L. REv. 1184 (1952).46 See Reese, supra note 12, at 793.
47 Nadelmann, supra note 14, at 75; von Mehren & Trautman, supra
note 8, at 1661; Schaaf, The Recognition of JTudgments from Foreign
Countries: A Federal State Clause for an International Convention, 3
HmAv. J. LEnis. 379, 382 (1966).
[ VOL. 43
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method of obtaining recognition for American judgments
in many other nations. "
A goal oriented approach to judgment recognition
clearly indicates that reciprocity, though proper in other
areas of international relations, should be excluded as a
consideration in this area. The Hfiltorn doctrine has
hampered the fulfillment of several of the relevant goals,
while proving a very unsuccessful weapon for achieving
any proper exclusive interests. Because of this, as will
be seen later, most American courts have refused to follow
Hilton.11
5) Res Judicata
The fundamental reason that foreign money judg-
ments generally receive the same conclusive effect as
sister-state judgments is the doctrine of res judicata.
While the full faith and credit clause adds constitutional
compulsion to res judicata applicability between sister-
states," the rationale behind res judicata has been con-
sidered equally applicable to judgments of foreign nations.
A brief consideration of the effect of res judicata on each
of the relevant goals should indicate the validity of this
approach.
48 The possibility of a "clear" renunciation of reciprocity by American
courts is not as simple as it may appear. Most American state courts
facing the problem have refused to follow Hilton. However, since Hilton
is a decision of the highest court in the land, other nations seeking
to ascertain reciprocity will often look to Hilton. Unless recognition
of foreign nation judgments is found to present a federal question or is
found to be governed by federal rules in diversity cases (and present
authority would answer both in the negative), it is difficult to see how
the Supreme Court can get an opportunity to overrule Hilton. These
problems will be discussed later in the paper.
49Even the courts that follow Hilton have circumscribed its application
by requiring it to be pleaded and proved by the party attacking the foreign
judgment. See Gull v. Constem, 105 F. Supp. 107 (D. Colo. 1952).
SoIn the opinion of this writer, the doctrine of res judicata, per se, is
not constitutionally necessary. For example, it is doubtful that Fl law must
provide that its money judgments may not be collaterally attacked in Fl.
If F1 law allowed such attack, clearly F2 could also allow it. However,
since the opinion that public policy requires there be an end to litigation
has resulted in res judicata doctrines as to most money judgments, full faith
and credit extends the doctrine to interstate applicability. An examination
of some opinions on child custody decrees and their effect might shed light
on the above.
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The first goal to consider is that of avoidance of
duplication and waste. When authorities state that "pub-
lic policy requires that there be an end to litigation," 51
this goal is a major rationale. Significantly, this concern
for the limitation of duplication is more manifest in
the United States than on the Continent. It is the moti-
vating force behind rules of compulsory counterclaim,
against splitting causes of action, permitting impleader,
intervention, class actions, etc." However, it is not cer-
tain that a second trial on the same cause of action will
merely involve a duplication of the first. Differences be-
tween juries, different choices of law by the judges, or
alterations in the detected demeanor of a key witness
might result in a completely contradictory second judg-
ment even among sister-states. When the first judgment
followed a trial in a foreign nation, particularly if a
civil-law nation, the possibility of major differences in
procedure, rules of evidence, choice of law, and general
outlook of the judicial system makes such a result far from
unlikely." On the other hand, to contend that contra-
dictory results -will occur in a substantial number of cases
involves a denial of the validity of at least one legal
system (a flip of a coin might suffice just as well). There-
fore, if the formal trial of issues is to remain as a legal
institution, it is necessary to assume that such a process
ordinarily finds the proper result. A limiting factor,
which will serve fairness as well as ensure the likelihood
of similar results if there had been a second trial, is the
assurance that the procedures used in F1 were reasonably
calculated to ascertain the truth and that F1 applied a
fair rule of law to the facts as discovered.
51 See Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 525
(1931), where the Court stated:
Public policy dictates that there be an end to litigation; that those
who have contested an issue shall be bound by the result of the con-
test, and that matters once tried shall be considered forever settled
as between the parties.
See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 98, comment b
(Proposed Official Draft, 1967).
52See von Mehren & Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudications:
A Survey and a Suggested Approach, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1601, 1604 (1968).
5' See Smit, International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the
United States, 9 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 44, 61-62 (1962).
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Other goals are also involved in international res judi-
cata, though to a lesser extent. International conflicts
might be avoided by recognizing a foreign nation's judg-
ments, although a cogent argument could be made that
non-recognition of unfair judgments will discourage their
rendition and in turn reduce potential conflict situations
in the future. Similarly, a refusal to grant res judicata
might reduce the number of judgments rendered by an
inconvenient forum. Additionally, res judicata might dis-
courage or encourage international trade and travel, de-
pending upon the perspectives of the individuals and the
consideration given to the fairness of the first judgment.
Clearly, however, security in international transactions will
be accelerated by recognition of foreign judgments.
Fairness to the litigants is a goal that is directly related
to res judicata doctrines. It is considered unfair to require
a party who has expended time and money in proving his
cause of action or defense to go through the whole process
again. This consideration, together with conservation of
judicial resources, forms the basis for res judicata 4 How-
ever, where there is a serious question as to whether the
first judgment was unfair, for one of several possible
reasons, the fairness to litigants goal would be served by
examining the validity of the F1 judgment. A goal-oriented
analysis, therefore, indicates that the doctrine of res judicata
should be enforced, unless for some reason it would be
unfair to bind a party to the judgment in question. Some
of the contexts in which a fairness claim must be balanced
against a res judicata claim are considered in the next
section."
54 The breakdown of the rule of mutuality of estoppel in the area of
collateral estoppel indicates that conservation of judicial resources is of
greater importance than prevention of the harassment of victorious litigants.
See 42 ST. Join's L. REv. 150 (1967).
55This article is concerned with the res judicata aspect of judgments,
i.e., when there is a second attempt to enforce or defend the original cause
of action. To be distinguished is the doctrine of collateral estoppel, which
prohibits the relitigation of issues that have already been determined be-
tween the parties, even when the first action was different from the second,
and res judicata inapplicable. A strong argument can be made against the
extension of collateral estoppel to foreign-nation judgments. See Smit,
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Factors Relating to Fairness in the Individual Case
(1) Competence of Court
The Restatement of Conflicts asserts that "a judgment
rendered by a court lacking competence to render it and
subject to collateral attack for that reason in the state of
rendition will not be recognized or enforced in other
states." " This is generally known to American lawyers
as subject-matter jurisdiction. The issue might arise, for
example, where F1 had special courts to deal with com-
mercial matters and a general court improperly rendered
judgment, or where a monetary limitation on a lower-
echelon court was exceeded by the judgment. This situa-
tion relates to fairness considerations, since the F1 legis-
lature has deemed the rendering court to be unqualified
to hear a case of that nature or significance. An additional
factor militating towards a subject-matter jurisdictional
test is that recognizing judgments deemed void in F1 would
encourage disregard of F1 procedures, and could theoreti-
cally cause ill feeling between F1 and F2.
However, there are serious drawbacks to such a test.
It would often be extremely difficult for an F2 court to
ascertain whether the F1 court acted beyond its competence,
and, even if it did, whether such defect rendered the judg-
ment void under F1 law. Obviously, the F1 court is in a
better position than any F2 court to decide questions of
its own jurisdiction. Re-examination elsewhere could be
regarded as a lack of respect for F1 institutions." Addition-
ally, the F1 hearing might have been perfectly fair, and
it would be a waste of judicial resources to compel retrial.
It would seem that the most effective policy, arrived
at by balancing the interests, consists of, first, placing the
burden on the objecting party to prove that a substantial
supra note 53, at 57-61. The problem was noted by the Delaware Supreme
Court in Bata v. Hill, 39 Del. Ch. 258, 163 A.2d 493, 505-06 (1960), where
the court concluded that considerations of fairness should be decisive.5 6
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 105 (Proposed Official
Draft, 1967).
57 Cf. RESTATEMENT FOREIGN RELATIoNs, mtpra note 28, at § 41, com-
ment f.
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question of F1 competence exists, and, second, staying
enforcement of the judgment while the objectant seeks to
attack the judgment in Fl.
(2) Jurisdiction Over the Parties
The question of what are the acceptable bases of juris-
diction to apply law to a particular situation and particular
parties has created the greatest amount of controversy in
international judgment recognition policy. International
law does not proscribe the arbitrary creation by a state of
competence to apply law to persons unrelated to the state
in any substantial way. However, a judgment rendered
upon an exercise of "judicial jurisdiction" unacceptable to
F2 will not be recognized. In the United States, it would
seem unconstitutional to recognize a judgment rendered
without any substantial contacts with defendant. 9 A recent
article lists the functions thought to be served by such a
policy."0 The basic function of imposing a judicial juris-
dictional test is to assure that it was fair that defendant
was required to litigate the issues in the courts of Fl.
An examination of the types of contact that F1 deems
sufficient to give its courts jurisdiction over foreigners also
might serve as an indication of the general fairness of
F adjudicatory procedure. An added factor, not generally
considered, is that judgments rendered against defendants
with whom the state had only slight contact are apt to be
default judgments. Of course, a recognition test based on
judicial jurisdiction carries the added dividend of being
fairly easy to administer, i.e., no need to go into the merits
or rule of law applied in the particular case. The F2 court
need only investigate whether there was a sufficient nexus
between the defendant and F1 to justify its assumption of
jurisdiction to apply, and, if so, F2 will recognize the
58 See Graupner, supra note 19, at 374.
G9In Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 229 (1946), the Court stated that
"due process requires that no other jurisdiction shall give effect, even as a
matter of comity, to a judgment elsewhere acquired without due process."
See Sedler, Recognition of Foreign Judgments and Decrees, 28 Mo. L. Ray.
432, 447 (1963).60 von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 52, at 1610
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judgment unless there is another ground to deny con-
clusiveness.
In making its determination of the validity of Fl's
jurisdiction, there are four tests which F2 might provide:
(1) satisfaction of Fl's jurisdictional requirements; (2)
satisfaction of the requirements imposed by F2 upon its
own courts for their assumptions of jurisdiction over per-
sons; (3) satisfaction of both; or (4) satisfaction of an
international standard of jurisdiction. The Restatement
of Conflicts apparently adopts the fourth test, by its as-
sertion that "a state has power to exercise judicial jurisdic-
tion over a person if the person's relationship to the state
is such as to make the exercise of such jurisdiction reason-
able." 1 This seems the most effective means of achieving
most of the relevant goals at the least expense to the
fairness goal. However, an added requirement that the
judgment would not be considered void in F1 should be
added for the same reasons stated in the discussion of
competence of the F1 court.
Obviously, the major difficulty in applying an inter-
national standard is in determining the standard to be
applied.2
What can be stated with some confidence are certain
secondary claims to judicial jurisdiction clearly acceptable
to the world community, and certain claims to judicial
jurisdiction almost definite to cause difficulty with other
states. Among the former are continuous residence of
defendant, contractual agreement on court, and jurisdiction
61 R-STATEMENT OF CONFLICTS, supra note 56, at § 24(1).
62 RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICTS, supra note 56, at § 27, provides:
(1) A state has opwer to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an
individual on one or more of the following bases:
(a) presence; (b) domicile; (c) residence; (d) nationality or citizen-
ship; (e) consent; (f) appearance in an action [as a defendant or as
a plaintiff]; (g) doing business within the state; (h) an act done in
the state; (i) causing an effect in the state by an act done elsewhere;(j) ownership, use or possession of a thing in the state; (k) other
relationships to the state which make the exercise of judicial jurisdic-
tion reasonable.
Subsequent sections explain that the question of reasonableness is to be
superimposed on each of the above potential bases for assertion of jurisdic-
tion to apply.
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over plaintiff on defendant's counterclaim. 3 To these could
probably be added the commission of a tort or doing
business within a state, for causes of action arising from
such activities." Deserving of more attention, because of
the problems that they create are some of the more arbitrary
initial and secondary claims to judicial jurisdiction, in
which unfairness to the defendant and inconvenience of
trial are likely to result.
The foremost, in notoriety, of such claims arises from
Article 14 of the French Civil Code. The Civil Code was
drafted at a time when France was at war with the rest
of Europe, and reflects the unfriendly sentiments felt then
toward foreigners. 5 Accordingly, Article 14 provides that
French courts have jurisdiction to hear any action brought
by a Frenchman against anyone, no matter where the de-
fendant resides or where the relevant acts occurred."
A second such claim, referred to in the discussion of Jean
Claude Killy's predicament, most notably asserted by the
German Civil Procedure Code, grants unlimited jurisdiction
over a non-resident who owns assets of any amount located
in G'ermany." Though the initial reaction of American
lawyers to this obviously unreasonable claim to jurisdiction
would be one of resentment, closer examination reveals
some similarity to the quasi-in-rem jurisdiction available
in American state courts. While theoretically quasi-in-rem
jurisdiction is only up to the amount of the property at-
tached at the initiation of the action, in practice it often
works the other way. This is due to the general absence
of provisions for a limited appearance, i.e., a rule that
03 See Graupner, supra note 19, at 375.
6 Cf. Graupner, supra note 19, at 377; N.Y. Civ. PRAC. § 302.
65 R. AGHION, FRENCH LAW As APPLIED To BRITISH SUBJECTS & COM-
PANIES 92 (1935).
Id. at 91. At one time, Article 14 was available in Belgium, the
Netherlands, Luxembourg, parts of Italy, and parts of Germany, as well as
France. Today, it finds general application only in France, Luxembourg,
and, with slight modification, the Netherlands. However, reciprocity clauses
in Belgium and Italy provide for jurisdiction over a foreigner on any basis
available under the national law of the foreigner, and thus Article 14 is
still available for retaliation. Nadelmann, Jurisdictionally Improper Fora in
Treaties on Recognition of Judgments: The Common Market Draft, 67
COLUm. L. REv. 995, 998-99 (1967).
67 Nadelmann, supra note 66, at 999.
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would allow the defendant to participate on the merits
without thereby subjecting himself to full jurisdiction
in personam. 6  Faced with the practicality of forfeiting
the seized property, defendants often are coerced into
defending on the merits, with in personam consequences,
in an unreasonable forum. 9 The third, and most familiar,
problematical claim to judicial jurisdiction is that arising
from service on defendant within the state. While this is
the traditional basis for judicial jurisdiction under the
common law, based upon conceptions of power, it is clearly
alien to the civil law. This is because jurisdiction in
civil-law countries is conceived as pre-existing the formal
commencement of the action. Service of process is neces-
sary only to ensure notification, and does not affect juris-
diction over the controversy."0 When it is realized that
the "power" claim to judicial jurisdiction, pursued to its
logical limits, would permit the assertion of jurisdiction
over an alien served with process on board an airplane
passing over a state's territory, it becomes apparent why
civil-law countries are skeptical.71
The possibility of developing concepts of judicial juris-
diction which could find support among the entire world
community will be considered later.
68 The quasi-in-rem type of jurisdiction is no longer available in England,
and the distinction between in personam and quasi-in-rem judgments is little
known abroad. See Nadelmann, supra note 66, at 1005. Where attachment
of an alien's property causes him to appear and defend on the merits, prob-
ably the resulting in personam judgment would receive treatment similar to
that accorded other American judgments. Also, where the assets seized are
tangible property located within Fl, little difficulty is likely to arise. How-
ever, where intangible property, such as contract claims, tort claims, and
interests in corporations, are "seized" and there is no defense on the merits,
the judgment would seem in trouble if a situation were to arise for challenge
abroad. Seizure of intangibles as a basis for quasi-in-rem jurisdiction is
condoned by Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
6 For a controversial holding on seizure of an intangible, see Seider v.
Roth, 17 N.Y.2a 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966), where the
obligation of a liability insurer, which did business in New York, to defend
and indemnify the insured, was deemed attachable for purposes of quasi-in-
rem jurisdiction. See generally RESTATEmENT OF CONFLIcTs, supra note 56,
at §§ 65-68.
70See A. NUSSBAUm, PRrCNiPLF.rs OF PRiVATE INTEENATiOxAL LAW 193
(1943).
7xSee Grace v. McArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959).
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(3) Conduct of the F1 Proceedings
An initial consideration is the question of notice and
opportunity to defend. The Restatement of Conflicts pro-
vides:
A state may not exercise judicial jurisdiction over a person,
although he is subject to its judicial jurisdiction, unless a reason-
able method is employed to give him notice of the action and
unless he is afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard.7 2
In the United States, a judgment against a defendant who
was not notified of the action or was not given the op-
portunity to defend is precluded by the due process clause
from recognition. 3 Obviously, a goal-oriented approach
would also dictate a policy of non-recognition-the fairness
to litigants goal easily outweighing any other goals that
might be served by recognition.
Notice need not be identical to American modalities,
but should be reasonably calculated to apprise defendant
of the action in ample time to prepare his defense. How-
ever, even the relatively simple question of what notice
would be reasonable in a particular case may present
difficulties. A case in point is Boivi v. Talcott.7 4  There
the court refused to recognize a Quebec default judgment
against an Ohio domiciliary, although the Quebec court had
exercised its discretion to direct personal service on de-
fendant, since the only service required under the Quebec
statute was publication. 5
Another factor to be considered is the fairness of F1
procedure in general. While an American court may be
more reluctant to recognize the judgment of a foreign court
with significant differences in procedure from American
courts, this fact alone will not result in non-recognition.6
72 RESTATEmENT OF ComFLicrs, supra note 56, at § 25.
73 See Sedler, supra note 59, at 450.
7 102 F. Supp. 979 (N.D. Ohio 1951).
7GThe court reasoned along the lines of Wuchter v. Pizzuti, 276 U.S. 13
(1928). Distrust of service by publication is manifest in the Supreme
Court's decision in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank, 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
7 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
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Provisions regarding trial by jury, rules of evidence, etc.,
will not affect the conclusiveness given to the F1 deter-
mination. If the F1 procedure is so arbitrary a method
of fact-finding as to offend our sense of "natural justice,"
recognition will be denied." Since most judgments for
which enforcement is sought in the United States were
rendered in nations with well-developed legal systems, this
type of claim is unlikely to arise often.
However, a similar claim, more likely to be made, is
that the F1 procedure was unfair in this particular case.
There may be allegations of perjury, bribery of the judge
or jury, or misleading the defendant into not adequately
presenting his case. In England, fraud will be considered
a defense to such judgments," and most other European
nations would deem it contrary to public policy to recognize
such judgments. 9 Unlike English courts, American courts
will ordinarily enforce a foreign judgment where the fraud
alleged is deemed intrinsic, i.e., where the F1 court had
the opportunity to pass upon it. 0 For example, objections
that perjured testimony or falsified documents were pre-
sented to the court will not be considered. Only allegations
of extrinsic fraud, where the court could not pass upon
the facts, will suffice if proven to negate the judgment."'
For example, if plaintiff misled defendant into believing
he had discontinued the action, the judgment could be
attacked.2
77 In Banco Minero v. Ross, 106 Tex. 522, 172 S.W. 711 (1915), a
Mexican judgment rendered after a very summary proceeding, in which
appeal was blocked due to a failure to affix a stamp to defendant's papers,
was refused recognition. A similar English case is Nouvron v. Freeman,
15 App. Cas. 1 (1889).
78A. DicEY & J. MoRRIS, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1009-11 (8th ed. 1967).
78 Lorenzen, The Enforcement of American Judgments Abroad, 29 YALE
L.J. 268, 278 (1920).
8o See Reese, The Status in this Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad,
50 COLUM. L. Rv. 783, 794 (1950).
8s It is uncertain whether the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recog-
nition Act, adopted by several states, continues the intrinsic-extrinsic dichot-
omy. 9B U.L. ANN. § 27 (Supp. 1964). For an opinion that it does, see
Note, The Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, 64 MIcH.
L. Rxv. 308, 311 (1965).
82It has been held that if the foreign court has had the opportunity to
consider the merits of the claim of extrinsic fraud, the judgment is con-
clusive. Harrison v. Triplex Gold Mines, Ltd., 33 F.2d 667 (1st Cir. 1929)
(Canadian decree).
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In the opinion of this writer, the distinction between
intrinsic and extrinsic fraud is a rational one. In fact,
where the extrinsic fraud has deprived defendant of a real
opportunity to present his case, due process would probably
require a new trial. Where the party objecting to the F1
judgment presents clear and convincing evidence of intrinsic
fraud, the suggested approach is to stay enforcement,
pending application for relief in Fl. If this fails, and the
objecting party has a valid claim, it may be best to allow
him opportunity, through foreign office negotiation, to
persuade F1 to look into the matter. The extreme difficulty
involved in any attempt by F2 to examine claims of perjury
should preclude such attempts. The witness is likely to be
unavailable; the trial record, if there is one, is likely to be
in a foreign tongue. The fact that F1 had an opportunity
to hear the evidence, and the adoption of the policy
described above which may secure a second consideration
of the claim by F1, would seem to weigh the scale in favor
of recognition if the F1 judgment remains unchanged.
An additional question is the treatment to accord to
foreign default judgments. Since the possibility of unfair-
ness is much greater where defendant did not appear in F1,
courts are less likely to grant conclusive effect to the
judgment..3  Clearly, F2 should carefully examine the
propriety of and factual support for the F1 assertion of
judicial jurisdiction. In addition, plaintiff should be made
to prove that 1 required him to present some proof of
damages suffered. If both requirements are met, a proper
accommodation of the relevant goals militates towards
recognition. A contrary policy would encourage aliens
not to appear in actions brought against them even in
convenient and reasonable forums.8
83 Sec Lorenzen, msipra note 79, at 281. In the recent case of Falcon
Mfg. (Scarborough) Ltd. v. Ames, 53 Misc. 2d 332, 278 N.Y.S.2d 684(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1967), the court stated that a Canadian default judgment
was not as persuasive as a litigated judgment would have been.
84 For default judgments, as for other judgments, there should be no
recognition in F2 unless the judgment is final in Fl. This is clearly the
law for foreign and sister-state judgments. Recognition, or at least en-
forcement, should similarly be stayed for a reasonable time when a serious
possibility of collateral attack in F1 exists.
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(4) Choice of Law
The primitive idea that a forum always should apply
its own law prevailed until about the year 1200, when the
doctrine emerged that the applier of law should look to
the law which is most convenient and reasonable to apply
to the situation.85 However, there is still widespread con-
fusion between the concept of jurisdiction to apply, i.e.,
judicial jurisdiction, and jurisdiction to prescribe, or legis-
lative jurisdiction.86 It is still unclear whether a state
should have more contacts with the controversy and the
parties when it claims competence to legislate the rule
of law to be applied to given situations or when it claims
competence to adjudicate a controversy as to the merits
and as to the rule of law to be applied to the facts as
ascertained. For example, assume a sales contract nego-
tiated in New York to be performed in Ontario. The seller
defendant sends defective goods into Ontario, but does not
allow himself or his agent to set foot in Ontario. The
decision-maker, either F1 or, upon review, F2, might well
conclude that the rule of law to govern the action should
be Ontario's; however, the Ontario court did not have
jurisdiction to apply its law to the defendant for lack of
contact with Ontario. However, since this paper is sug-
gesting a limited choice of law test for recognition in addi-
tion to a test of Fl's judicial jurisdiction, there seems no
need to draw a precise line between the quantum or type
of contact to be required by one test as compared with
the other.
More relevant is a pointing out of the different con-
siderations involved in reviewing the choice of law by F1
from those involved in attempting a review of the findings
of fact. The primary distinction is that a choice of law
review would be a much simpler process. The basic goals
served by res judicata, viz., conservation of judicial resources
and prevention of harassment of victorious litigants, would
not be much hindered by such a test since no new trial
85 Yntema, The Objectives of Private International Law, 35 CAN. BAR
RIy. 721, 722 (1957).
s6See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 52, at 1637.
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would be necessary unless the choice of law is found, upon
motion before the court, to have been sufficiently erroneous
to justify non-recognition. In fact, it might in some cases
be possible to accept the fact-findings as conclusive, while
modifying the judgment itself by changing the law to be
applied. Another benefit of a choice of law test is that
not all cases in which it is decided by F2 that Fl's choice
of law was erroneous will require non-recognition. If the
law applied by F1 (usually its own) is basically identical
to the law(s) of the state(s) whose law F2 might well
determine should have been applied, the propriety of FlI's
choice of law would be academic.
A different. type of consideration which must be men-
tioned is that valid exclusive interests of F2 are more likely
to be adversely affected by an arbitrary choice of law by F1,
than by a possible error in its findings of fact.
The usual situation in which a choice of law test
becomes relevant is where there is a claim that F1 chose
an improper law to apply. There are nations in which
the courts prefer to apply forum law even when an examina-
tion of contacts reveals that forum policies were not really
involved in the controversy." The "public policy" of F2
would probably dictate a refusal to recognize such a judg-
ment, particularly where it is thought F2 law was the
proper law to be applied. Moreover, since application of an
improperly chosen rule of law is a denial of due process,"8
recognition of such a judgment would probably involve
a denial of due process. Here a distinction between sister-
state and foreign judgments is urgent. Full faith and
credit requires recognition of sister-state judgments despite
clear mistake in the law chosen, even if the first choice of
law was unconstitutional." Aside from the argument that
87 France, once again, is the prime example. See Castel, Jurisdiction and
Money Judgments Rendered Abroad: Anglo-American and French Practice
Compared, 4 McGmL L. REv. 152 (1958). Even the supposedly progressive
New York Court of Appeals occasionally displays some of this tendency.
See Wyatt v. Fulrath, 16 N.Y.2d 169, 211 N.E.2d 637, 264 N.Y.S.2d 233
(1965).
8 Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
s0 Cf. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
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such a limitation is only required by the internal func-
tioning of a federal system, it is a vital consideration that
there is a United States Supreme Court available to review
an unconstitutional finding of legislative jurisdiction. 0
Apart from its own due process implications, an examina-
tion of the choice of law made by F1 could be a helpful
aid in ascertaining the overall fairness of Fl's treatment
of foreigners.
Of course, our goal-oriented approach precludes too
expansive a choice of law test. A test which required the
choice of law by F1 to be the same that F2 would have
made would be too great a hindrance to the goals of
avoidance of conflict and security of transactions, not
justified by considerations of fairness to litigants or the
exclusive interests of a state in controlling events which
affect its own territory, people, and institutions or of ful-
filling its particular public policies. The optimum policy
would require the F1 choice of law to have a rational
basis. Since contacts relevant to judicial jurisdiction
generally will also provide legislative jurisdiction, such a
denial of recognition to a judgment rendered on adequate
judicial jurisdiction will be exceptional. However, this may
occur if judicial jurisdiction was based on service within
the state or on appearance, and accepted as valid by F2.
A general test would be to determine whether the situation
out of which the cause of action arose involved a serious
impact upon the state's control over its people, territory,
or institutions. Naturally, the mere fact that a national
of F1 was involved in the controversy would not suffice.
On the other hand, if all parties are F1 nationals, the
result might be different.
A second choice of law problem can arise where F1
decides to apply F2 law, and then misapplies it. Since
states can and do apply foreign law, and since they do
have difficulty in determining what such law actually is,
this situation is not a freak. A balancing of the interests
90 A similar position was taken by the Supreme Court in Tremines v.
Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939). This caused some embarrass-
ment, since certiorari had been denied despite an unconstitutional judgment.
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indicates a greater amount of review by F2 would be
desirable here. Less problems of conflict between different
exclusive interests or justified reliance on Fl's judgment
are involved than in the prior situation. Once there is
general agreement (by F1 and F2) that F2 law should
apply, clearly the courts of F2 are most qualified to deter-
mine what that law is.
Another issue related to choice of law problems arises
when the claim is made that recognition of the F1 judg-
ment would violate F2's public policy due to the nature
of the underlying cause of action. For example, a French
judgment ordering a man to support his son-in-law was
denied recognition.9 Similar results might obtain where
the F1 judgment was based on gambling or usurious trans-
actions. 2 Obviously, the F1 judgment will not be so treat-
ed when the underlying cause of action is recognized under
F2 substantive law. In fact, the general policy is to recog-
nize foreign judgments, at least where the F1 choice of law
was reasonable, unless the cause of action fundamentally
offends F2 concepts of what is just.9"
When the F2 court is faced with this type of a public
policy claim, it has three alternatives. It may enforce the
judgment for plaintiff,94 refuse to entertain the action at
all,95 or apply its own law to the controversy, with or with-
OLDeBrimont v. Penniman, 7 F. Cas. 309 (No. 3715) (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1873).
92 See Lorenzen, The Enforcement of American .,edgments Abroad, 29
YALE L.J. 268, 279-80 (1920). These examples should be distinguished from
those in which, for example, recognition is denied a foreign judgment
rendered in disregard of American anti-trust legislation. The latter case
would present considerations of improper choice of whose law should apply,
not upon inherent repugnancy of the underlying cause of action.
93 In Neporany v. Kir, 5 App. Div. 2d 438, 173 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1st Dep't
1958), a Canadian judgment for alienation of affections was recognized
despite a New York statute forbidding such a cause of action.
94 In these cases, the F1 plaintiff is relying on the judgment.
95 This is the usual procedure in the analogous area of treatment of for-
eign penal and revenue judgments. Since these cases involve a foreign
sovereign or political subdivision as a party, different considerations are
present. This is reflected by the rationale asserted by courts in refusing
to entertain such suits that this policy is most likely to avoid offending
foreign nations. All tax and penal judgments, whether fair or arbitrary,
rendered by a friendly nation or a foe, are treated "equally" by the courts,
.e., refused enforcement. See Stoel, The Enforcement of Foreign Non-
Criminal Penal and Revenue Judgments in England and the United States,
16 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 663 (1967).
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out a new examination of any controverted facts, and
render a new judgment." The alternative that F2 should
follow depends primarily upon the relationship that F1
and F2 have to the controversy. For example, where F2
precludes tort actions by a wife against her husband, but
both parties are domiciliaries of F1 where such actions are
permitted, the judgment should be recognized. Similarly,
a French judgment ordering a man to support his son-in-
law should be recognized if the parties are French. Ob-
viously, the analysis presented in the choice of law discus-
sion becomes relevant. Once again, where F2 is an Amer-
ican court, application of its public policy, and rendition
of a new judgment thereunder, may violate due process
where the dispute was essentially foreign."
How TO ORDER RECOGNITION POLICY
The Present Predicament
The method of attaining desired recognition policies
presents special problems where a federal system is in-
volved. Claims of competence to prescribe recognition
policies are made by courts of the several states, as well as
by courts of the federal government. Generally, the policies
adopted by the various courts have been very similar, prob-
ably because the full faith and credit clause and notions
of res judicata are held in common. Long before the
Supreme Court in Hilton v.. Guyot 8 announced the liberal
treatment it would accord foreign judgments (though sub-
ject to a reciprocity test), state courts were giving conclu-
sive effect to fairly-rendered judgments of foreign coun-
tries." However, the exposition of the reciprocity test by
the Hilton Court caused a distinct split in recognition
96 In this type of case, F2 may deem summary judgment for defendant
proper, finding no recognized cause of action existing.
97 Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
98 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
9 9 The commercial state of New York led the way. See Dunstan v.
Higgins, 138 N.Y. 70, 33 N.E. 729 (1893); Lazier v. Wescott, 26 N.Y. 146
(1862); Comment, Reciprocal Enforcement of United States and Foreign
Judgments, 2 TEx. INT'L L.F. 75-82 (1966).
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policy in American courts. The dichotomy was made pos-
sible by the prevailing opinion that recognition of foreign-
nation judgments does not present a federal question, and
state courts are therefore free to formulate their own
policies.' 0
California was among the first states to assert this
autonomy. In 1907, California passed a statute in response
to the refusal of German courts to recognize California
state and federal court judgments against a German insur-
ance company after the San Francisco earthquake and fire
of 1906. Germany, a strict reciprocity state, did not con-
sider the United States to accord sufficient deference to
German or other foreign judgments.' The basic purport
of the California statute was to attempt to secure favorable
treatment of California judgments abroad by renouncing
the reciprocity test of Hilton. In New York, where a large
proportion of these proceedings are brought, the Court of
Appeals went out of its way to disapprove the Hilton hold-
ing.' The Uniform Foreign Mloney-Judgments Recogni-
tion Act, adopted by several states, does not require reci-
procity.' Other states apparently have adopted the reci-
procity requirement of Hilton; in many states, particularly
100 This view finds support in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Tremblay, 223 U.S.
185 (1912), where appeal from a state court was denied for want of a
federal question.
201 CAL. CODE CIr. Paoc. § 1915. See Nadelmann, Non-Recognition of
American Money Judgments Abroad and What To Do About It, 42 IoWA
L. REv. 236, 252-54 (1957). According to the commentary to the German
Civil Procedure Code, the United States is not included on the list of
countries considered to satisfy reciprocity because:
Foreign judgments are to a large degree recognized by the decisions
of the courts-which, in the main, constitute the sole source of law
-but a possiblity for re-examining the substance remains to a certain
extent. Reciprocity, therefore, cannot be considered as guaranteed.
Id. at 253-54. See Comment, supra note 99, at 82.
102 Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 242 N.Y. 381, 152
N.E. 121 (1926). Since Johnston involved an -American plaintiff who lost
in France to a French defendant, and who tried to sue again in New York,
the Court of Appeals did not have to expressly repudiate Hilton. In any
event, the holding a year later in Cowans v. Ticonderoga Pulp & Paper
Co., 219 App. Div. 120, 219 N.Y.S. 284 (3d Dep't), aff'd on opinion below,
246 N.Y. 603, 159 N.E. 669 (1927), directly rejected Hilton. See Comment,
The Present Status of the Doctrine of Hilton v. Guyot, 6 S. TEX. L.J.
129, 135-36 (1962).
1039B U.L. ANN. § 27 (Supp. 1964). See Note, supra note 81, at 308.
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inland, the question has never arisen."' The point to be
made is that there is no uniformity among states at least
as to the reciprocity issue.
An additional effect of state competence is that federal
courts in diversity cases, under Erie R.k. Co. v. Tomp-
kins 1o5 and Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co.,"' are
apparently required to follow the recognition policies of the
states in which they sit. This is the general assumption
of courts and commentators, though this writer has found
no federal decision directly in point.' An argument could
be made, under the recent decision of Hanna, v. Plummer,'
that state law should not be controlling in federal courts.
The Supreme Court, in holding that the Federal Rules gov-
ern service of summons in diversity cases, stated:
The "outcome-determination" test . . . cannot be read without
reference to the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of
forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of
the laws.109
Obviously, the applicability of the reciprocity rule, if in
issue in federal court, will affect the outcome of the suit
on the foreign judgment, i.e., the result would be different
from that which would have occurred had a state court (in
a state which does not require reciprocity) decided the
litigation. However, it is possible that application of a
federal rule, viz., reciprocity, in diversity cases would not
-violate the more sophisticated test of Hanna. In the rare
case that parties on both sides of the foreign judgment are
domiciliaries of the same American state, the Hilton doc-
trine probably does not apply. In other cases, there will
be federal diversity jurisdiction, directly or by removal,
104 Surveys of the positions of the various states are attempted in Com-
ment, supra note 102, at 135 and Note, The Enforceability of Foreign Judg-
ments in American Courts, 37 NoRE DAmE LAW. 88, 92 (1961).
105 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
1o6 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
107 See Smit, International Res .udicata and Collateral Estoppel in the
United States, 9 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 44, 47-48 (1962). Gull v. Constam, 105
F. Supp. 107 (D. Colo. 1952), was not in point since Colorado had not
taken a position either way.108380 U.S. 460 (1965).
109 Id. at 468.
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so that forum-shopping would not avail plaintiff anything.
However, the primary flaw in this argument is the limita-
tion on removal from state courts where the defendant is a
domiciliary.
In any event, at present, state law dominates the area
of recognition of foreign judgments. In fact, the prevailing
opinions that recognition policy does not present a federal
question and that state law governs in a federal diversity
litigation combine to render it apparently impossible for
the Supreme Court to find an opportunity to pass once
again on the matter. This situation results in several
difficulties.
If the Hilton Court was correct in its opinion that
reciprocity is a valid policy in this area, the effect of such
a policy is clearly frustrated by the abolition of the doc-
trine in several states.110 If, as believed by this writer,
reciprocity is an unwise policy in these cases, individual
state action is a poor way to rescind it. Stability in inter-
national transactions, i.e., that a given situation receive
the same legal treatment everywhere, is hampered with no
compensating gain in other relevant goals. It is obviously
undesirable to make a judgment creditor's legal rights
depend upon the particular American state in which he
locates the person or assets of his judgment debtor.
Of perhaps greater importance to the interests of the
United States, the present system is unlikely to secure
recognition for American judgments abroad. As previously
discussed, despite the fact that in general American courts
accord conclusive effect to foreign adjudications, our judg-
ments are treated shabbily in other nations, with the
notable exceptions of England and most Canadian pro-
vinces. Several reasons have been suggested for this un-
happy plight. Consider a hypothetical New York judg-
ment rendered against an F2 national. When the victorious
110 There remains a substantial amount of opinion, particularly abroad,
that reciprocity is a valuable weapon with which to negotiate with other
nations to secure favorable treatment for a nation's own judgments. See
Nadelmann, Reprisals Against Anerican Jvdgments, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1184,
1186-87 (1952).
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litigant seeks recognition in F2, the court is likely to
overlook the New York decisions favoring foreign judg-
ments and base its conclusion upon Hilton V. Guyot."'i
Such a procedure is not necessarily arbitrary, since for-
eign courts are aware that the Supreme Court is the
highest American tribunal, and even American authorities
are uncertain as to the extent of Hilton's viability. Even
if F2 were willing to examine the particular position of
the rendering American state (assuming it had taken a
position), in New York's case a rejection of Hilton, F2,
especially if it is a civil-law nation, may refuse recognition
due to the absence of a statute in F1 mandating recognition
of F2 judgments.1 12  Possibly if New York were to adopt
the Uniform Act, this objection would be thwarted. How-
ever, recognition still might well be refused due to the
procedural requirement prevailing in American states that
execution can be availed of only after the F1 judgment
is converted to an F2 judgment."' Under the concept of
exequatur, as developed in France, the F2 proceeding
merely declares the F1 judgment to be entitled to exe-
cution, there being no need for a formal F2 judgment."'
Obviously, this distinction is more apparent than real.
Even sister-state judgments must be converted before they
may be executed in F2."11 The F2 procedure, even where
foreign nation judgments are involved, is usually summary
and does not entail any re-examination of the merits."'
However, a foreign court may not see it this way. As has
been seen, while the state dominance in recognition of
foreign judgments is not the sole cause of poor treatment
III See Schaaf, The Recognition of Judgments from Foreign Countries:
A Federal-State Clause for an International Convention, 3 HARv. J. LEGIS.
379, 384 (1966); Comment, supra note 99, at 98; Note, snpra note 81, at
309.
112See Nadelmann, supra note 110, at 1188; Note, supra note 81, at 308.
"'See Lenhoff, Reciprocity: The Legal Aspect of a Perennial Idea,
49 Nw. U.L. REv. 752, 763 (1955); Nadelmann, supra note 110, at 1188.
11 4 See R. AGHION, FRENCH LAW As APPLIED To BRITISH SUBJEcTs &
COMPANIES 102 (1935).
115 This conversion is not necessary among federal courts. A district
court judgment rendered in one state may be registered in any other district
court and thereby become worthy of execution.
116 See N.Y. Crv. PRAc. § 313.
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of American judgments abroad, it is a contributing and
limiting factor. In any event, even if foreign nations
were willing to examine the statutory or common law
of particular American states, the result would be recog-
nition of some American judgments but not others, though
equally valid.1 7  The desirability of this is doubtful.
Constitutionality of State Control
Despite an antiquated Supreme Court holding 8 and
the general opinion of state courts, the present constitution-
ality of state control over judgment-recognition policy is
in doubt. The possibility of constitutional infirmity may
be inferred from a reading of two recent Supreme Court
decisions, Banco aoional de Cuba v. Sabbatino. 9 and
Zschernig v. Miller,"0 which may manifest a new attitude
against the validity of state claims to competence to dictate
policy when foreign relations are involved.
In Sabbatino, a Cuban corporation largely owned by
Americans contracted to sell sugar to an American com-
modity broker. Thereafter, motivated by the United States
Government's reduction of the Cuban sugar quota, the
Cuban Government seized the corporation's sugar in Cuban
territory. The Cuban Government allowed the sugar to
be shipped to New York, under the expectation that it
would now receive the proceeds. When the commodity
broker refused to pay, the New York supreme court pre-
pared itself to adjudicate the question of title. How-
ever, the matter was removed from the state court's
authority when the Cuban Government sued for conversion
in federal district court in New York. The eventual
opinion of the Supreme Court, that the act of state
117 Federal diversity suit judgments will cause even greater confusion.
Since the rendering court was apparently bound by the conflicts law of the
state in which it sits, it would seem that it should be treated in the same
fashion as would that state. Yet, the fact remains that such court is
under the supervisory authority of the Supreme Court, and must therefore
pay homage, though probably not obedience, to Hilton v. Gayo.118Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Tremblay, 223 U.S. 185 (1912).
119 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
120389 U.S. 430 (1968).
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doctrine precludes American courts from examining the
propriety of the taking, will not be further discussed here.
Rather, the statements by the majority on one particular
point will be highlighted. The Court stated:
We could perhaps in this diversity action avoid the question of
deciding whether federal or state law is applicable to this aspect
of the litigation. New York has enunciated the act of state
doctrine in terms that echo those of federal decisions. . . . How-
ever, we are constrained to make it clear that an issue concerned
with a basic choice regarding the competence and function of
the Judiciary and the National Executive in ordering our relation-
ships with other members of the international community must
be treated e~xclusively as an aspect of federal law.121
If Sabbatino is seen as a harbinger of a federal coup
of state power in the foreign-judgment area, the Zschernig
decision is a more convincing omen. Oregon officials
petitioned the state probate court for escheat of an estate,
the sole heirs of which resided in East Germany. The
petition was based upon an Oregon statute requiring as
a prerequisite for an alien to inherit, first, that there
be a reciprocal right of an American citizen to inherit
property in the alien's country, second, that American
citizens have the right to receive payments in the United
States of funds from estates in such country, and, third,
that the foreign heirs have the right to receive the pro-
ceeds without confiscation. 2 Although there was a sub-
stantial question as to whether a 1923 treaty with Germany
precluded the operation of the state provision in this
case, the Court declined to consider the matter, since
the "history and operation of this Oregon statute make
clear that it is an intrusion by the State into the field
of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts to the
President and the Congress." 123 Despite an amicus curiae
brief by the Justice Department to the effect that the
Oregon statute did not in this case interfere with foreign
relations, the Court condemned the manner in which this
121 376 U.S. at 424-25.
122 ORE. REv. STAT. § 111.070 (1968).
123 389 U.S. at 432.
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type statute 'launched inquiries into the type of govern-
ments that obtain in a particular foreign nation."' 24
The Court continued:
As one reads the Oregon decisions, it seems that foreign policy
attitudes, the freezing or thawing of the 'cold war,' and the like
are the real desiderata. Yet they of course are matters for the
Federal Government, not for local probate courts. 125
The Court consequently overruled Clark v. Allen, 28 the
authority of which apparently had been reaffirmed as late
as 1962 by the dismissal of an appeal for want of a
substantial federal question in Ioannou v. New York. 2"
Mr. Justice Harlan, in a concurring opinion, would
have preferred the Court to have based its holding upon
the treaty.
If the flaw in the Oregon statute is said to be that it requires
state courts to inquire into the administration of foreign law, I
would suggest that the characteristic is shared by other legal
rules which I cannot believe the Court wishes to invalidate.
For example, the Uniform Foreign-Money judgments Act pro-
vides that a foreign-country money judgment shall not be recognized
if it "was rendered under a system which does not provide
impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the require-
ments of Due Process of law." 128
Clearly, state courts are not only empowered, but required,
to impose a due process criterion on foreign judgments.
This would probably be so even if the United States
entered into a treaty forbidding states from such inquiry.'29
However, other criteria which states might impose upon
foreign judgments, beyond a simple due process require-
ment, might conceivably be affected by the wrath of the
124Id at 434.
125 Id. at 437-38.
126331 U.S. 503 (1947).
121371 U.S. 30 (1962).
228389 U.S. at 461.
129While the treaty power is quite broad, the consensus is that it could
not allow what the Constitution expressly proscribes.
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Zschernig majority.130 An examination of the recent New
Hampshire recognition statute lends support to this view.
Apparently, the statute was enacted in angry response
to poor treatment accorded by Quebec to New Hampshire
judgments. The statute reads:
In suits on judgments rendered in the courts of the Dominion of
Canada or any province thereof, said judgments shall be given
such faith and credit as is given in the courts of the Dominion
of Canada or any province thereof to the judgments rendered
in the Courts of New Hampshire. 31
It is hard to characterize this piece of legislation as some-
thing other than an instance in which an individual
state has formulated its own foreign policy. Statutes
or cases requiring reciprocity, without singling out any
particular foreign state, are less obvious though probably
no less invidious state formulations of foreign policy.
The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law defines the
foreign relations law of the United States as
(a) international law... ;
(b) that part of the domestic law of the United States by which
it gives effect to rules of international law;
(c) any other part of the domestic law of the United States
[including state law] that involves matters of significant
concern to its foreign relations. 32
Although recognition of foreign judgments, strictly speak-
ing, does not present questions of international law, a
130 The opinions which assert that state law can govern recognition ques-
tions have often used as authority for this proposition Supreme Court
cases whose continued vitality is doubtful after Sabbatino and Zschernig,
particularly Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947), which condoned state
alien inheritance laws. See Schaaf, supra note 111, at 383.
'3'N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §524:11 (Supp. 1967). Massachusetts enacted
the uniform act, but added a general reciprocity requirement. MAss. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 235, §23A (Supp. 1968).
'
3 2 RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 2(1) (1965 rev. ed.). See Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad
v. Tompkins Applied to International Law, 33 Am. 3. INT'L L. 740, 743
(1939), where the learned author states:
Any question of applying international law in our courts involves the
foreign relations of the United States and can thus be brought within
a federal power. . . . It would be as unsound as it would be unwise
to make our state courts our ultimate authority for pronouncing the
rules of international law.
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cogent argument can be made that such matters are of
significant concern to foreign relations. Approaching the
problem from the point of view of valid state interests
to be protected, it would appear that the individual
American state has a more significant interest in determin-
ing the distribution of its domiciliaries' estates than it
has in deciding questions of judgment recognition. If the
Supreme Court may interfere with the state's inheritance
laws, why should states be permitted greater freedom in
formulating judgment recognition policies?
However, though the question should be posed, it seems
doubtful that the Supreme Court would hold unconstitu-
tional state formulations of recognition policy, at least
under the present condition of state law on the subject.
Judgment recognition does not involve issues which are as
sensitive diplomatically as the issues involved in Sabbatino
or even Zschernig. This is reflected by the following
language in the Sabbatino opinion:
Whether a foreign sovereign will be permitted to sue involves
a problem more sensitive politically than whether the judgments
of its courts may be re-examined, and the possibility of embar-
rassment to the Executive Branch in handling foreign relations
is substantially more acute. Re-examination of judgments, in
principle, reduces rather than enhances the possibility of injustice
being done in a particular case .... 33
In addition, the two major reasons why a state might
deny recognition do not seem likely to warrant Supreme
Court disapprobation. The first such possibility would be
an examination of the procedural fairness in Fl. How-
ever, primarily since almost all recognition claims made
in American courts come from civilized and "friendly"
nations, a general examination of the fairness of F1 pro-
cedure is rare. This is to be contrasted with the relatively
large number of instances in which aliens from "iron-
curtain" nations claim inheritances in the United States.
While an examination of Fl's procedural fairness (in-
cluding basis of jurisdiction) in a partiular case is
IS 376 U.S. at 412.
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likely to occur fairly often, this is a requirement of federal
constitutional law.
The other major instance in which state courts may
deny recognition is when F1 flunks its reciprocity test.
Theoretically, a state which refuses to follow a reciprocity
criterion is making an independent formulation of foreign
policy. However, the resulting recognition of foreign
judgments is unlikely to be considered an interference
with foreign relations. This is due, in part, to the
general disapproval of the reciprocity requirement by Amer-
ican commentators. On the other hand, a denial of
recognition by a state for lack of reciprocity, although
more likely to stir up diplomatic tremors, would probably
not be disturbed, since the state was only following the
lead of the Supreme Court itself.
However, despite this writer's opinion that state con-
trol over recognition policy is not unconstitutional, it is
believed that federal control is more likely to attain the
inclusive and exclusive interests being sought. This fol-
lows from the probably tautologous conclusion that federal
control will alleviate the problems discussed above which
are created by state control.
Since the conclusion is easily reached that a reasoned
uniform recognition policy will be more successful than
fifty (or fifty-one) reasoned recognition policies, the sole
remaining rationale against federal control must find
its roots in tenth amendment doctrine. However, it is very
doubtful that the states would resent the deprivation of
control over foreign judgments, especially if the projected
federal rule abrogates the reciprocity requirement. The
great majority of actions on money judgments, viz., on
sister-state judgments, are under federal control via the
full faith and credit clause. It would not be particularly
earth-shaking to subject the remainder to like authority.
THE] MBANS oF F ] J. CONTROL
Absent congressional' and executive action in the area,
the Supreme Court_would be required to formulate recog-
nition policies. This eventually is undesirable in several
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respects. First, assumption by the Supreme Court of
recognition-policy control must rest upon a finding that
state determinations are unconstitutional. Such a finding
would be of dubious propriety. Of greater disturbance
is the fact that the judicial branch is the least qualified
institution to assess the relevant goals and formulate
optimum policies. The Supreme Court would be ill-
equipped to ascertain which foreign legal systems are of
sufficient integrity to warrant a presumption of conclusive-
ness and which are not. Obviously, a branch of govern-
ment with general investigatory power and ability would
be more capable. Similarly, the Supreme Court is out
of its element when it decides or attempts to avoid de-
ciding issues affecting foreign relations. This becomes
apparent when one notes the reception accorded to the
Court's solutions in two such instances, Hilton and Sab-
batino. Questions concerning the particular practicality
of retorsion or involving examination of the likelihood
of international conflict are beyond the competence of the
Supreme Court.
Consequently, the conclusion that is reached is that
some mode of joint action by the executive and legislative
branches would be preferable. Admittedly, there is no
express constitutional authority for such action. Hlow-
ever, the federal government has been conceded extensive
powers to act where foreign affairs are concerned. As ex-
pounded by Mr. Justice Frankfurter:
Although there is in the Constitution no specific grant to Congress
of power to enact legislation for the effective regulation of foreign
affairs, there can be no doubt of the existence of this power in
the law-making organ of the Nation. The States that joined
together to form a single Nation and to create, through the Con-
stitution, a Federal Government to conduct the affairs of that
Nation must be held to have granted that Government the
powers indispensable to its functioning effectively in the company
of sovereign nations. The Government must be able not only
to deal affirmatively with foreign nations, as- it does through
the maintenance of diplomatic relations with them and the pro-
tection of American citizens sojourning within, their territories.
It must also be able to reduce to a minimum the frictions that
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are unavoidable in a world of sovereigns sensitive in matters
touching their dignity and interests. 134
"In view of the present unsatisfactory state of the law,
with its potentialities for injustice to Americans seeking
recognition for American judgments abroad, a congressional
finding of need for national legislation would probably not
be overturned by the courts." 135 And once it is concluded
that Congress has power to legislate in the area, it follows
a fortiori that a treaty, as well as a congressional-executive
agreement, would be within the Government's constitutional
authority."8
A federal statute would probably alleviate several of
the problems presently in existence. First, such legislation
would enable foreign courts, applying reciprocity standards
to American judgments, to determine where we stand on
foreign judgment recognition. Many nations are apt to
pay more attention to a federal statutory overruling of
Hilton v. Guyot (assuming that decision is presently a
ground for refusing recognition to American judgments)
than would be paid to the case-law encroachments upon
the doctrine. In fact, a congressional-executive act, whether
statute or treaty, may well be the only available means of
abrogating the Hilton doctrine; the Supreme Court will
never get an opportunity to reconsider the reciprocity
doctrine unless it concludes either that foreign judgment
recognition is constitutionally a federal question (unlikely)
or that federal courts in diversity cases must follow
federal law on this matter (equally unlikely). In ad-
dition, a federal statute, prescribing a uniform rule for
the entire nation, would serve to ensure that the treat-
1234 Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1957).
135 Schaaf, supra note 111, at 388. Mr. Schaaf examines the various
possible sources of constitutional authority for federal legislation. Id. at
385-91.
336 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). The term "congressional-
executive agreement" is used to describe an executive agreement between
the President and a foreign government which is supported by congressional
legislation. It would appear that this method may be used interchangeably
with the treaty method, which requires consent of two-thirds of the Senate.
For purposes of this paper, "congressional-executive agreements" may be
substituted whenever the use of the treaty power is discussed.
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ment of an American judgment abroad will not depend
upon the particular state which rendered it. Conversely,
foreign judgments will be similarly treated in every
American court. There would thus be a beneficial effect
on security in international transactions, as well as a
desirable decrease in forum shopping.
An additional advantage of this approach is that a
congressional-executive combination (the usual means of
enacting a statute) is most qualified to determine the
standards for recognition. An evaluation of the judicial
systems of various countries could be most effectively
made. In addition, these branches can best decide the
propriety of a reciprocity rule.
However, it would appear that the treaty method
would be the most beneficial means of ordering judgment
recognition. This approach seems likely to reap all
the benefits that a federal statute would attain, as well
as several other dividends. First, proceeding by treaty
appears to be a more tactful manner of selecting the
nations whose judgments are deemed fair and reliable.
A statutory prescription on recognition which listed the
nations whose judgments should be recognized would be
likely to offend those nations omitted from such list, the
obvious implication being either that the judicial system
of an omitted nation is untrustworthy or that it is un-
worthy for some other reason, e.g., that it does not give
due deference to the judgments of others. Germany has
such a list, supplementing several treaties, from which
the United States is excluded, and a scanning of American
commentators reveals the ill-feeling that this has aroused.'
If, instead, Germany denied recognition to American judg-
ments for lack of a treaty on the subject between Germany
and the United States, protest would be lessened. In ad-
dition to serving the inclusive interest of minimizing inter-
national discord, the treaty approach seems clearly best
calculated to advance the exclusive interest of the United
States in securing recognition abroad for its own judg-
137 See, e.g., Nadelmann, supra note 101, at 253-57.
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ments. The majority of nations with which Americans
have substantial contact, and consequently in which recog-
nition of American adjudications is likely to be sought,
have sufficiently advanced and reliable judicial systems as
to justify a mutual-recognition treaty. Upon conclusion of
a treaty, the contracting nations are bound by international
law to recognize judgments rendered in accordance with
its terms.
Obviously, a multilateral convention would be best
calculated to achieve stability and uniformity in inter-
national judgment recognition. The Hague Conference un-
successfully sought such a treaty in 1925, and a second
attempt is presently in progress.138 The European Eco-
nomic Community is also working on a multilateral con-
vention, in conformance with the design of Article 220
of the Treaty of Rome which established the Community.'
However, principally due to the disparity in concepts of
jurisdiction to apply, multilateral conventions have been
difficult to attain.4 0 The need has been partially met
through a number of bilateral treaties. Several recent
treaties among the members of the European Economic
Community have led to recognition never before possible,
through a substantial alteration of the various domestic
laws." ' Of more significance to the American dilemma
are the several treaties entered into by England with
civil-law neighbors. Prior to the treaties England com-
pleted in 1934 with France and Belgium, the general
opinion was that the differences in concepts of jurisdiction
between common and civil-law nations made agreement on
138See Schaaf, supra note 111, at 379-80; Nadelmann, French Courts
Recognize Foreign Money-Judgments: One Down and More to Go, 13 Am.
J. Comp. L. 72, 80 (1964).
'
39 See Nadelmann, Jurisdictionally Improper Fora in Treaties on Recog-
nition of Judgments: The Common Market Draft, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 995,
996 (1967) ; Nadelmann, supra note 138, at 80.
'1o4The Bustamente Code was a noteworthy attempt at a multilateral con-
vention by South American civil-law countries. 86 LEAGUE OF NATIoNs
TRn ATY SERIEs 111 (1928). See Castel, Jurisdiction and Money Judgments
Rendered Abroad;'Anglo-American and French Practice Compared, 4 McGnL
L. REV. 152, 195 (1958).
'
41 See Graupner, Some Recent Aspects of the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Judgments in Western Europe, 12 INT'L & COup. L.Q.
367, 379-80 (1963); Comment, supra note 99, at 87-97.
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judgment recognition impossible. 42 Those and subsequent
British treaties were admittedly made possible by limiting
the coverage to judgments rendered on jurisdictional bases
acceptable to both.'43 Hlowever, their apparent success should
encourage a change in attitude by the United States, which
has been reluctant to conclude any such agreements.
The treaty solution, like most panaceas, is not so easily
achieved. Many of the benefits which would flow, as sug-
gested above, from the conclusion of treaties, particularly
that of security of international transactions, can not be
secured unless the entire world community enters into
judgment recognition conventions with similar provisions
(or a sufficient number do so as to create new customary
international law). Several difficulties militate against
this possibility. First, the persistence of unreasonable
claims to judicial and, to a lesser extent, legislative jur-
isdiction provides a number of judgments which many
nations would deem fundamentally unfair to enforce. A
related and more difficult problem is the absence of gen-
erally accepted international rules on jurisdiction to apply
and prescribe. Remedial action is hampered by the lack
of concern for the problem in some nations, which con-
sequently reduces the likelihood of effecting a change in
their internal procedures.'"
However, the unlikelihood of achieving an optimum
public order in the recognition of judgments sphere should
not discourage attempts to achieve improvements upon
the present situation. Even if the above-mentioned dif-
culties are impossible to completely obviate, treaties should
142 See Nadelmann, supra note 101, at 260.
143 England has a statute dealing with recognition of foreign judgments
which has facilitated the creation of treaties. Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal
Enforcement) Act, 23 Geo. 5, c. 13 (1933). However, the act limits the
substance of treaties created under its authority. As regards jurisdiction
to apply, common-law rules based on effective power and submission are
barely extended. See A. DicEy & J. MoRus, CONFLICT OF LAws, 967 (8th
ed. 1967); Graupner, supra note 141, at 380-81.
144 A nation might reason, not without logic, that, for example, the
occasions in which one of its nationals will be seeking to enforce one of
its judgments in an American court will be rare, and, consequently, not
worth the effort of altering its internal law as to recognizing Americanjudgments or as to rendition of its own judgments.
1969 ]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
be sought which will establish recognized minimum stand-
ards of jurisdiction to prescribe and apply, so that at
least some judgments will be assured favorable treatment
abroad. This has been the British approach. In addition,
"the mere process of seeking agreement is valuable. It
often sharpens the real area of dispute, making partial
agreement possible elsewhere, and perhaps encouraging a
compromise of the dispute itself." 145
TYPE OF TREATY SUGGESTED
A proposed convention should seek to ascertain which
of the various claims to jurisdiction are acceptable to the
world community. In many situations, diverse concepts of
jurisdiction will yield the same result for different reasons.
Take, for example, Jean Claude Killy. While a common-
law jurisprude would rebel against an assertion of un-
limited personal jurisdiction based on the location of an
asset within the state, he might readily in opposite cir-
cumstances claim judicial jurisdiction based upon the
commission of a tortious act within the state. A system
should be devised that will ensure recognition to judgments
in which the exercise of judicial or legislative jurisdiction
was reasonable, despite the disparity between the rationales
for the assumption of such jurisdiction. It is submitted
that certain common denominators are available to make
feasible an international accord on jurisdiction.
One such common denominator would seem to be the
concept of forum non conveniens. Most American courts
will dismiss an action with which the state had little
connection, other than the mere presence of defendant
within the state at the time of service of summons. This
is despite the technical presence of "judicial jurisdiction"
by common-law though not civil-law criteria. If, on the
other hand, not only was defendant served within the
state but the contract underlying the dispute was to be
145 Falk, International Jurisdiction: Horizontal and Vertical Conceptions
of Legal Order, 32 TEMP. L.Q. 295, 319 (1959).
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performed within the state, an American court would assert
and exercise jurisdiction to apply, and this secondary
claim to jurisdiction would not be "alien to the civil law."
In short, a treaty ordaining initial and secondary claims
to judicial jurisdiction should include a general provision
of the following type:
A state has jurisdiction to apply law in any case in which it is
not unreasonable to require the defendant to litigate the particular
dispute in that forum.
This is similar to the view taken by the Restatement of
Conflicts,' 6 and is ordinarily the result in common-law
jurisdictions anyway, despite the "power" concept, through
use of forum non conveniens.47 Both common and civil
law recognize the utility of litigating where the facts in
issue occurred. Consequently, there should be specific
provisions describing the instances in which the exercise
of jurisdiction would not be unreasonable, e.g., the place
in which the tort was committed or the contract performed.
The treaty would provide that the contacts deemed to
support judicial jurisdiction should relate to that aspect
of the intercourse between the litigants which is in issue.
For example, the jurisdiction in which the contract was
negotiated should not be an operative consideration when
the question of the formation of a contract is not dis-
puted, the controversy involving questions of proper per-
formances.
Another factor which is apparently a common de-
nominator, i.e., one which practically every nation would
agree is not an unreasonable basis for a claim of jur-
isdiction to apply, is that of consent. Naturally, guide-
lines for determining what constitutes consent would be
set forth. The basic instances which this test would
cover include contractual agreement on jurisdiction, vol-
untary appearance, and counterclaim against a plaintiff.
14 6 RESTATEiENT (SEcoND) or CO NFLICr OF LAws §24 (Proposed Official
Draft. 1967).
147 The general American rule that a case will not be dismissed for forum
non conveniens if the plaintiff is a domiciliary of the state would have to
be restricted when the treaty is applicable.
1969 ]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Another potential common denominator could be dom-
icile or nationality. Since domicile has peculiar connota-
tions in the common law, and nationality is of much
greater import to the civil law, perhaps a compromise term
acceptable to both systems could be formulated. One such
possibility is the concept of "habitual residence," developed
in a recent convention on adoption.'48 In fact, claims that
nationality of defendant per se is a sufficient basis of
jurisdiction to apply are unlikely to arouse discord, since
traditionally nations have been accorded wide powers over
their nationals.'49
The proposed treaty should also contain choice of law
guidelines. In this area, the fundamental concepts of
jurisdiction, i.e., legislative, are not as diverse as in the
jurisdiction to apply area. There are two alternative choice
of law mandates which may properly be made part of the
convention. The first is the grouping of contacts doctrine,
which has ascended in American law in recent years.
This mandate would direct a particular law to be applied.
The second possibility would be to require merely leg-
islative jurisdiction, i.e., that the law chosen by F1 should
be a reasonable law to apply under the circumstances of
the particular case. The famous New York case of Bab-
cock v. Jackson, '5  may be slightly altered to furnish a
hypothetical which hopefully will explain the difference.
Plaintiff accompanied defendant and his wife on a week-
end trip to Canada. All the parties were New Yorkers,
and the trip began and was to end in New York. While
defendant was driving his car in Ontario, he lost control
and crashed into a stone wall. Under the Ontario guest
statute, plaintiff would be pIlecluded from recovering.
However, the Court of Appeals held that New York law
should apply, viz., no guest statute, since the interest of
New York in this issue was much greater than that of
148 See Lipstein, The Tenth Session of the Hague Conference on Private
International Law, 1964, 1965 CAMBRiDGE L.J. 224.
149 Such claims have even been asserted by the United States, where
nationality is less emphasized than in Europe. Blackmer v. United States,
284 U.S.' 421 (1932).
150 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d (1963).
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Ontario. Assume, however, that the action had been
commenced in an Ontario court. If such court were to
follow the grouping of contacts principle, it would prob-
ably apply New York law, since the decision of New
York to refuse immunity to its domiciliaries is of concern
mainly to New York. However, it would not be unreason-
able, under the territoriality principle of jurisdiction to
prescribe, for Ontario to have applied its own law. In the
former case, the result would be the same as actually
occurred in the New York litigation; in the latter case,
defendant would have escaped liability completely.
Security in international transactions, through the util-
ization of a uniform rule of law, might be equally achieved
by a ubiquitous use of a third approach-strict, inflexible
choice of law rules, e.g., place of tort, place where con-
tract completed (to govern issues concerning formation),
place where contract to be performed (to decide questions
of performance). While this approach fits within the
"reasonable" category,, i.e., territoriality being a reasonable
basis of jurisdiction, it is more calculated to assure iden-
tity of result despite the forum chosen than a general
admonition to apply a reasonable prescription. In the
latter case, a forum could and often would apply its own
law if it has substantial, though not the greatest, con-
tacts. This is likely to lead to different rules of law
applied by different forums, although it would not be
fundamentally unfair to the parties. While the use of
inflexible rules would achieve uniformity, a general adop-
tion of the grouping of contacts doctrine would effectuate
other inclusive and exclusive interests, with only minor
hindrance to uniformity. The nation most concerned with
the issue should be the nation to prescribe governing rules
of law, to be applied without reference to the actual
forum.
Since the grouping of contacts approach requires more
of a surrender of a forum state's autonomy, it might be
more difficult to achieve general acquiescence to such a
rule. However, the benefits likely to accrue justify efforts
to incorporate it into a convention.
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Another, less troublesome, provision of the proposed
treaty would state that F1 will agree to reconsider its
judgment if F2 refers the case back. This might arise,
for example, where there are serious questions of perjury
in the F1 hearing.
It should also be recognized that a state need not alter
its domestic principles of jurisdiction when there is no
potential impact beyond its own borders. Hopefully, this
provision would decrease the reluctance of some nations
to enter into a treaty.
Possibly of equal importance to the substantive pro-
visions of the proposed treaty are the procedural terms.
Clearly, a multilateral treaty would best achieve stability
and uniformity in international transactions. However,
it would be difficult for the United States to exclude nations
whose judicial systems are suspect. The suggested solu-
tion is for bilateralization of a multilateral convention.
In other words, the multilateral accord as to standards of
recognizing initial and secondary claims of jurisdiction
will not become effective, as between two nations, until
they have concluded an agreement to that effect.
An additional procedural device, suggested by several
recent commentators, is a federal-state clause for any
treaty, multilateral or bilateral, entered into by the United
States. Under this suggestion, the treaty would allow each
American state the choice of assuming its benefits and
burdens."1  Such a provision would result in increased
recognition of the judgments of states consenting to the
treaty, while obviating any contentions of federal inter-
ference with state courts. However, it is the opinion of
this writer that the two-way loss of uniformity which would
result outweighs the dubious benefit.
151 Schaaf, supra note 111, at 385; Nadelmann, supra note 101, at 259.
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CONOCLUSION
Obviously, a treaty such as suggested above would
be an effective step toward achieving the goals relevant to
judgment recognition. However, it must be realized that,
absent an international decision-maker with effective ver-
tical control of initial and secondary claims to jurisdiction,
voluntary self-restraint by individual states is necessary
to enable the world community to create and implement
agreements on judgment recognition. In addition, such
restraint will facilitate and encourage the movement of
goods, services, and people across national boundaries.
The essence of horizontal order is the rational self-delimitation
of competence by each State. The process of self-delimitation
should seek to take maximum account of the existence of other
States and give effect to a mutually satisfactory standard of
reciprocity. 1 2
152 Falk, sipra note 145, at 320.
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